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ADMITTING EXPERT TESTIMONY ON BATTERED WOMAN
SYNDROME IN VIRGINIA COURTS: HOW PEEPLES1
CHANGED VIRGINIA SELF-DEFENSE LAW
Domestic violence continues to be a significant problem
nationwide. "Each year, close to four million Americans are
physically abused by their spouses or partners; 37 percent of women
seeking emergency room treatment in 1994 for violence-related
injuries were injured by a former or current spouse or partner."2
This national plague of abuse is also costly to the private sector, as
"[tihe Bureau of National Affairs estimates that family violence
costs employers at least $3 billion to $5 billion a year in lost days of
work and reduced productivity."3 Virginia has an increased cost as
well, because a victim seeks help from a state domestic violence
program an average of every twelve minutes.4 Furthermore, "[i]n
a recent fiscal year, more than 48,200 people requested services
from Virginia's spous[all abuse programs.
What happens to these women?6 They can stay in a dangerous
situation, try to leave, or they can strike back while defending
themselves. This Note deals with those situations in which a
woman strikes back in self-defense and consequently is prosecuted
under a criminal assault charge,7 specifically in the Commonwealth
of Virginia. This Note, however, does not argue either that the
battered woman does not have a reasonable claim of self-defense,
or that she may, indeed, have an "abuse excuse" that explains and
justifies her actions. Instead, this Note raises questions as to the
adequacy of merely admitting expert testimony generally in
Battered Woman Syndrome (BWS) cases in Virginia.
1. Peeples v. Commonwealth, 504 S.E.2d 870 (Va. Ct. App. 1998).
2. Bill McKelway, Angry Men: Counselor Attempts to Calm the Rage of Those Who
Perpetrate the Violence, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH, Oct. 18, 1998, at G-1.
3. Id.
4. See id.
5. Id.
6. For simplicity, this Note uses gender-specific terms for batterer and victim.
Understanding the ramifications of such convenience, the overwhelming majority of books
and articles consulted for this piece studied mainly female victims of domestic violence. In
fact, the Battered Woman Syndrome cases cited here involved heterosexual relationships in
which the abuser was male. For a discussion of Lesbian and Gay battering, see generally
Nancy Hammond, Lesbian Victims and the Reluctance to Identify Abuse, in NAMING THE
VIOLENCE: SPEAKING OUT ABOUT LESBIAN BATTERING 190 (Kerry Lobel ed., 1986).
7. See generally Symposium, Self-Defense and Relations of Domination: Moral and
Legal Perspectives on Battered Women Who Kill, 57 U. Pirr. L. REV. 461 (1996), for
discussions of self-defense law and battered women who kill their abusers.
8. The definition of Battered Woman Syndrome used in this Note is the same one coined
by psychologist Dr. Lenore Walker:
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This Note will explain the status of self-defense law, both
before and after the decision in Peeples v. Commonwealth,' with a
special emphasis on how this decision will change the criteria for
admitting Battered Woman Syndrome testimony in Virginia courts.
The Note also will discuss the problems associated with Battered
Woman Syndrome and will suggest that case-specific jury instruc-
tions would better serve those abused women who do have genuine
self-defense claims of "imminent danger."' ° Specifically, this Note
will assert that effectively drafted jury instructions would weed out
those marginal cases that make "bad law" and would avoid the re-
victimization of battered women that occurs through proffering
unaccompanied BWS testimony as a lesser version of an insanity
plea.
BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME TESTIMONY IN VIRGINIA
BEFORE PEEPLES
Before September 1998, the law of self-defense in Virginia
summarily dismissed the use of expert testimony regarding
Battered Woman Syndrome as an inadmissible diminished capacity
defense"l and therefore irrelevant in criminal prosecutions. 2 In
A battered woman is a woman who is repeatedly subjected to any forceful
physical or psychological behavior by a man in order to coerce her to do
something he wants her to do without any concern for her rights. Battered
women include wives or women in any form of intimate relationships with men.
Furthermore, in order to be classified as a battered woman, the couple must go
through the battering cycle at least twice. Any woman may find herself in an
abusive relationship with a man once. If it occurs a second time, and she
remains in the situation, she is defined as a battered woman.
LENORE E. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN xv (1979).
Battered Woman Syndrome testimony is not offered only by defendants in criminal
assault or homicide cases or even solely in criminal cases. See generally State v. Dunn, 758
P.2d 718 (Kan. 1988), habeus corpus granted sub nom. Dunn v. Roberts, 768 F. Supp. 1442
(D. Kan. 1991), affd, 963 F.2d 308 (10th Cir. 1992) (offering BWS testimony to explain a
defendant's presence af the scene of a crime); State v. Ciskie, 751 P.2d 1165 (Wash. 1988)
(offering BWS testimony to explain a victim's delay in reporting a rape); State v. Lambert,
312 S.E.2d 31 (W. Va. 1984) (using BWS testimony to argue coercion and lack of criminal
intent in a case concerning welfare fraud, a nonviolent offense). BWS testimony can be used
by both men and women. See Commonwealth v. Stonehouse, 555 A.2d 772, 774 n.1 (Pa.
1989). For simplicity, this Note discusses Battered Woman Syndrome testimony in the
context of women defendants using it to substantiate a self-defense claim of criminal assault
in Virginia.
9. 504 S.E.2d 870 (Va. Ct. App. 1998).
10. See infra note 22 for the definition of "imminent danger."
11. See infra notes 56-57 and accompanying text for a discussion of the inadmissibility
of diminished capacity defenses in Virginia.
12. See Commonwealth v. Hackett, 32 Va. Cir. 338, 338 (1994) (citing Jenkins v.
Commonwealth, 423 S.E.2d. 360, 367 (Va. 1992); Stamper v. Commonwealth, 324 S.E.2d.
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1993, the law in Virginia was changed explicitly to allow evidence
of the abuse to be admitted 3 but not of the psychological ramifica-
tions of that harm' 4-- particularly its manifestation as a change in
the ability of the victim both to perceive her situation and to
determine her next course of action.15 Essentially, evidence of the
abuse was admissible, but not necessarily the attached syndrome.
This rule allowed the jury to hear relevant abuse evidence but not
682, 688 (Va. 1985)). For a review of self-defense law involving Battered Woman Syndrome
expert testimony before both the 1993 enactment of Virginia Code section 19.2-270.6 allowing
abuse testimony and the common law change in self-defense law in September 1998, see
generally Sara E. Hauptfuehrer, Comment, Battered Women and Self-Defense: Admissibility
of Expert Testimony on the Battered Woman Syndrome in Virginia, 10 GEO. MASON L. REV.
171 (1987). For a discussion on BWS admissibility under the Federal Rules of Evidence, see
generally Margaret M. Prendergrast, Case Note, Evidence-The Admissibility of Expert
Testimony on Battered Woman Syndrome under the Federal Rules of Evidence-Arcoren v.
United States, 65 TEMPLE L. REV. 341 (1992).
13. Virginia law changed in 1993 with the enactment of Virginia Code section 19.2-270.6,
which states that "[iln any criminal prosecution alleging personal injury or death, or the
attempt to cause personal injury or death, relevant evidence of repeated physical and
psychological abuse of the accused by the victim shall be admissible, subject to the general
rules of evidence." VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-270.6 (Michie 1995).
14. See Hackett, 32 Va. Cir. at 338-39 (stating that although the defendant may testify
about the circumstances motivating her crime, expert testimony as to the state of mind of
the defendant was inadmissible). All abuse evidence is still subject to the general
admissibility rules of evidence under Virginia Code section 19.2-270.6. See § 19.2-270.6.
Proffered expert testimony on the psychological ramifications of the abuse generally is
excluded on relevancy grounds. This may be a high hurdle to clear, depending on the specific
facts of the criminal prosecution and the plea. See, e.g., State v. Necaise, 466 So. 2d 660, 664
(La. Ct. App. 1985) (excluding expert testimony because the defendant tried to assert a
defense of insanity, not only because evidence of insanity required that notice be given to the
prosecution but also because such evidence was inadmissible under Louisiana law if the
defendant pled not guilty).
15. See Hackett, 32 Va. Cir. at 338. Admissibility of this type of testimony has varied
from court to court. Some courts have held this testimony inadmissible not because they are
ignorant to the plight of domestic violence victims, but rather because the proffered evidence
was deemed to be based on unreliable research founded on flawed methodology not generally
accepted. See State v. Thomas, 423 N.E.2d 137, 139 (Ohio 1981), overruled by State v. Koss,
551 N.E.2d 970 (Ohio 1990); Buhrle v. State, 627 P.2d 1374, 1376-78 (Wyo. 1981). But see
Ibn-Tamas v. United States, 407 A.2d 626, 638-39 (D.C. 1979), appeal after remand, 455 A.2d
893 (D.C. 1983) (stating that admissibility of expert testimony depends upon "whether there
is a general acceptance of a particular scientific methodology" rather than "an acceptance.
.. of particular study results based on that methodology," and that it could not find, "as a
matter of law, that Dr. Walker's methodology [fell] short"); Bechtel v. State, 840 P.2d 1, 7-8
(Okla. Crim. App. 1992) ("find[ing] that the Battered Woman Syndrome is a substantially
scientifically accepted theory"). Other courts have found such testimony not allowed in the
jurisdiction because only pleas of not guilty or not guilty by reason of insanity were
recognized and, when a not guilty plea is entered, defenses that try to establish the absence
of criminal intent are not allowed, see State v. Necaise, 466 So. 2d 660, 664-65 (La. Ct. App.
1985); or within the understanding of the jury in their capacity as laypersons and no expert
testimony would have proven helpful, see Thomas, 423 N.E.2d at 139; or outweighed in its
probative value by its overly prejudicial effect, see id. at 140.
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to hear an expert's explanation of how this abuse may have affected
the battered woman's judgment. 6
In September 1998, however, the Court of Appeals of Virginia
reconsidered the issue of expert testimony and the use of self-
defense in Peeples v. Commonwealth.17  Determining that the
affirmative justification of self-defense hinged on the defendant's
subjective perception of imminent harm,18 the court departed from
the long-established standard of allowing such expert testimony
only when the defendant pled not guilty by reason of insanity. 9
The decision effectively rendered testimony regarding the defen-
dant's state of mind at the time of the crime as not only relevant,
but crucial in deciding the truthfulness of a defendant's self-defense
claim.2 ° This expansion of the use of expert testimony in self-
defense cases may allow domestic violence victims the opportunity
to introduce expert testimony at trial to explain the state of mind
of the battered woman defendant at the time she struck back at her
abuser.2' Furthermore, this testimony may prove helpful to a jury
in judging her actions, especially when judging the reasonableness
of her actions and her perception of "imminent danger."
22
16. See Diana Patton, 'He Never Hit Me"--The Need for Expert Testimony in Domestic
Violence Cases, ARIZ. A"WY, Jan. 1994, at 10, *13, available in WL 30-JAN AZATT 10
(discussing the need for more than lay testimony of domestic violence); see also infra notes
139-46 and accompanying text for the problems associated with allowing only abuse evidence
to be heard by the jury under this standard.
17. 504 S.E.2d 870 (Va. Ct. App. 1998).
18. See id. at 873.
19. See id. at 875 (citing Stamper v. Commonwealth, 324 S.E.2d. 682 (Va. 1985)).
Stamper held "that evidence of a criminal defendant's mental state at the time of the offense,
in the absence of an insanity defense, is irrelevant to the issue of guilt." Stamper, 324
S.E.2d. at 688.
20. See Peeples, 504 S.E.2d at 875.
21. The function of admitting expert testimony on Battered Woman Syndrome is to assist
the trier of fact in evaluating the woman's self-defense claim, specifically the
"reasonableness" in her decision to use force, its severity, and the method she chose in using
force against her abuser. See, e.g., People v. Minnis, 455 N.E.2d 209, 217-18 (Ill. App. Ct.
1983) (using BWS testimony to explain why a woman dismembered her abuser after killing
him); see generally Regina A. Schuller, The Impact of Battered Woman Syndrome Evidence
on Jury Decision Processes, 16 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 597 (1992) (discussing two experiments
which found a positive association between the admittance of BWS testimony and lenient
verdicts).
22. Battered Woman Syndrome has been found to be relevant to a jury's deliberations
regarding "the perception in the mind of the defendant at the time of the killing as to how
a battered woman would perceive danger as being imminent even though her batterer was
not then in a position to pose immediate danger." Minnis, 455 N.E.2d at 215.
"Imminent" is defined as: '[n]ear at hand; mediate rather than immediate; close
rather than touching-, impending;, on the point of happening; threatening;, menacing;, perilous.
Something which is threatening to happen at once, something close at hand, something to
happen upon the instant, close although not yet touching, and on the point of happening."
BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 750 (6th ed. 1990). "Imminent danger" is defined as:
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Whether this type of testimony, by itself, would prove benefi-
cial to a battered woman defendant or a jury is questionable in light
of a recent societal backlash against the so-called "abuse excuse."23
Although the new rule regarding expert testimony articulated in
Peeples has opened the door for more juries to hear expert testi-
mony on Battered Woman Syndrome, this development in Virginia
self-defense law may not be very helpful to the battered women who
appear before Virginia courts unless there is a broader change in
the law of self-defense and revised jury instructions. Case-specific
jury instructions and a broadened definition of "imminent harm"
would allow for a more inclusive context in which to evaluate the
circumstances of these difficult cases.
SELF-DEFENSE LAW IN VIRGINIA
Self-defense is a recognized defense to criminal assault charges
in Virginia.24 At common law, self-defense is an affirmative
defense.25 It can be claimed by a defendant when she has used
necessary force to repel an attack, deadly if need be, when she
reasonably feared "death or serious bodily harm to [her] self at the
hands of [her] victim." 26 The defendant has the burden of proving
[Un relation to homicide in self-defense, this term means immediate danger,
such as must be instantly met, such as cannot be guarded against by calling for
the assistance of others or the protection of the law. Or, as otherwise defined,
such an appearance of threatened and impending injury as would put a
reasonable and prudent man to his instant defense.
Id. See infra notes 44-45 and accompanying text for a discussion of "imminent danger" in
terms of Virginia self-defense law.
23. These cases include, most notably, those of Erik and Lyle Menendez and Lorena
Bobbitt. See generally ALAN M. DERSHOWrrZ, THE ABUSE EXCUSE AND OTHER COP-Ours, SOB
STORIES, AND EVASIONS OF RESPONSIBILITY (1994) (discussing the use of various "abuse
excuses," including Battered Woman Syndrome, as improper rationalizations for negating
criminal responsibility).
24. This Note assumes that the self-defense issue will be raised in conjunction with a
defense to murder in order to negate the requisite mens rea, thereby reducing the charge of
murder to manslaughter. The Virginia Code allows for the conviction of lesser included
offenses in lieu of an indictment for homicide: "In any trial upon an indictment charging
homicide, the jury or the court may find the accused not guilty of the specific offense charged
in the indictment, but guilty of any degree of homicide supported by the evidence for which
a lesser punishment is provided by law." VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-266.1 (Michie 1995). The
Virginia Code allows abuse testimony only in a "criminal prosecution alleging personal injury
or death, or the attempt to cause personal injury or death" and limits its content to "abuse
of the accused by the victim." VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-270.6 (Michie 1995). It is unclear
whether abuse testimony would be allowed in cases in which the accused (i.e., the battered
woman) is pleading duress or coercion as an affirmative defense to criminal charges under
current Virginia law.
25. See McGhee v. Commonwealth, 248 S.E.2d 808, 810 (Va. 1978).
26. Id. at 810.
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this affirmative defense. 27  The Commonwealth need not offer
evidence rebutting the question unless it is raised by the
defendant.28
In asserting a self-defense claim, the defendant admits to the
killing but claims it was not intentional.29 Self-defense law in
Virginia actually recognizes two separate and distinct defenses
within this assertion. First, "excusable homicide" or "excusable
self-defense" applies when the defendant, who was previously at
fault in precipitating the combat, abandons the fight and retreats
before attempting to repel the attack. 30 Alternatively, "justified self-
defense" or "justifiable homicide" applies to a defendant who is free
from fault in provoking the attack.3' If the fact finder finds either
27. See Lynn v. Commonwealth, 499 S.E.2d 1, 9 (Va. Ct. App. 1998), affd, 514 S.E.2d 147
(Va. 1999).
28. See id. There is also no duty to retreat in Virginia self-defense law, at least when the
victim is attacked in her home and is without fault in the attack. See Gilbert v.
Commonwealth, 506 S.E.2d 543, 546-47 (Va. App. 1998) (holding that when accused is free
from fault in attack, she can stand her ground and repel the attack by force if necessary).
The court in Gilbert also found that a person threatened with death or serious bodily harm,
who has reasonable grounds to believe the threats will be carried through, has a right to arm
herself in order to "combat such an emergency." Id. at 547 (quoting Bevley v.
Commonwealth, 38 S.E.2d 331, 333 (Va. 1946)). Moving to disarm an attacker, however,
does not give the victim the subsequent right to use the attacker's weapon in resisting a
deadly attack. See Lynn, 499 S.E.2d at 10.29. See McGhee, 248 S.E.2d at 810. This does not preclude the defendant from asserting
additional defenses, such as the heat of passion, to defeat the requisite mens rea of a murder
charge. See Barrett v. Commonwealth, 341 S.E.2d 190, 192 (Va. 1986). When a defendant
asserts affirmative defenses of self-defense and heat of passion simultaneously, they are held
to not conflict with each other. See id.
30. See Lynn, 499 S.E.2d at 7.
31. See id. Any conduct by the defendant not free from fault, however, may be sufficient
to eliminate the justifiable self-defense claim. See Smith v. Commonwealth, 435 S.E.2d 414,
416 (Va. Ct. App. 1993).
"Justifiable homicide in self-defense occurs [when] a person, without any
fault on his part in provoking or bringing on the difficulty, kills another under
reasonable apprehension of death or great bodily harm to himself." If an
accused "is even slightly at fault" in creating the difficulty leading to the
necessity to kill, "the killing is not justifiable homicide." Any form of conduct
by the accused from which the fact finder may reasonably infer that the accused
contributed to the affray constitutes "fault."
"Excusable homicide in self-defense occurs where the accused, although in
some fault in the first instance in provoking or bringing on the difficulty,
when attacked retreats as far as possible, announces his desire for peace,
and kills his adversary from a reasonably apparent necessity to preserve
his own life or [to] save himself from great bodily harm."
Whether the danger facing the accused is "reasonably apparent" is
determined from the viewpoint of the accused at the time that he shot the
victim. However, his fear alone does not excuse the killing; there must be an
overt act indicating the victim's imminent intention to kill or seriously harm
the accused.
Id. at 416-17 (alterations in original) (citations omitted).
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of these defenses applicable, then the defendant is entitled to an
acquittal.32
As late as 1941, the Virginia Supreme Court required an objec-
tive test, in addition to its subjective test,33 in evaluating a defen-
dant's self-defense claim.3s In McReynolds v. Commonwealth,35 the
Supreme Court of Virginia explained:
It is not enough for the accused to say that he was terrified.
There is no way by which we can gauge his state of mind.
Moreover, one whose nerves were unstrung might have been
frightened by facts which would not have troubled an ordinary
man at all. It is for a jury to say whether they were reasonably
sufficient to warrant an ordinary man in believing that he stood
in danger of serious bodily harm."
Five years later, in Taylor v. Commonwealth,37 the Supreme Court
of Virginia expanded the objective "reasonable person" test to
include an evaluation of a self-defense claim in light of the sur-
rounding circumstances. 38 In 1992, the Virginia Court of Appeals
reaffirmed that a defendant's self-defense claim is to be evaluated
"through the eyes of the person allegedly threatened."39
In Harper v. Commonwealth,4 ° the Virginia Supreme Court
held that a defendant could assert a self-defense claim even if the
32. See Gilbert, 506 S.E.2d at 546 (citing Bailey v. Commonwealth, 104 S.E.2d 28, 31 (Va.
1958)).
33. The Supreme Court of Virginia defined the "subjective" test in Taylor u.
Commonwealth, 38 S.E.2d 440, 441 (Va. 1946), finding the tendered jury instructions
erroneous because they contained the italicized language below:
The court instructs the jury in that in passing upon the danger, if any, to which
the accused was exposed, you will consider the circumstances as they
reasonably appeared to the accused and draw such conclusion from those
circumstances as he could reasonably have drawn, situated as he was at the
time; in other words, the court instructs you that the accused is entitled to be
tried and judged by facts and circumstances as they reasonably appeared to
him, provided they would so appear to a reasonable man placed under similar
circumstances, and not by any intent that may or may not have existed in the
mind of the deceased.
Id. at 441. The court further explained that "[w]hat reasonably appeared to the accused at
the time of the shooting, as creating the necessity for the act, is the test and not what
reasonably appeared to him, provided it would so appear to some other reasonable person
under similar circumstances." Id.
34. See McReynolds v. Commonwealth, 15 S.E.2d 70, 74 (Va. 1941).
35. 15 S.E.2d 70 (Va. 1941).
36. Id. at 74 (citations omitted).
37. 38 S.E.2d 440 (Va. 1946).
38. See supra note 33.
39. Craig v. Commonwealth, 419 S.E.2d 429, 431 (Va. Ct. App. 1992).
40. 85 S.E.2d 249 (Va. 1955).
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danger of attack was not objectively real.41 The court cautioned,
however, that "[t]he bare fear that a man intends to commit
murder, however well grounded, unaccompanied by any overt act
indicative of such an intention, will not warrant killing the party by
way of prevention."4 2 Although the overt act requirement would
appear to allow evidence or testimony regarding the beatings a
victim has endured,43 the Harper court interpreted "reasonableness"
to require that the overt act of the battery "imminently" or "immedi-
ately" precede the victim's act of self-defense,45 effectively sealing
the fate of battered women claiming self-defense in Virginia.
For example, in Yarborough v. Commonwealth,6 the court
found that a woman who shot her abuser as he was reaching for his
sock, where she knew he kept a knife, could not claim self-defense
because her abuser's movement "was not such an overt act indica-
tive of his intention to kill or do great bodily harm to defendant as
would excuse the homicide."' Furthermore, the court found that
even though the trial court's declaration that defendant's continu-
ous relationship with her abuser (they had been together for seven
years, throughout which she had suffered abuse at his hand)48
deprived her from claiming to be without fault in the attack was
"incorrect," this consideration was not enough to reverse her
conviction as the trial court's ruling was based primarily on the
"correct" doctrine of self-defense.49
41. See id. at 254.
42. Id. at 254 (quoting Litton v. Commonwealth, 44 S.E. 923 (Va. 1903)).
43. See ROBERT F SCHOPP, JUSTIFICATION DEFENSES AND JUST CONVICTIONS 113 (1998)
("Regardless of the availability of a well-supported syndrome, evidence confirming a history
of battering provides the best support for the defendant's credibility because it directly
supports the aspect of her testimony that jurors may find dubious.")
44. There is a huge difference between "imminent" and "immediate" in terms of self-
defense law. The term "imminent" does not necessarily connote the temporal proximity that
"immediate" does. See Donald A. Downs & Evan Gerstmann, A Framework for Battered
Women: Self-Defense and the Necessity of the Situation, in DONALD ALEXANDER DOWNS,
MORE THAN VICTIMS: BATTERED WOMEN, THE SYNDROME SOCIETY, AND THE LAw 223, 229
(1996). Therefore, despite the court's conflation, the two should not be used interchangeably.
45. "In order to justify an accused in striking another with a deadly weapon, as the
accused admits he did in this case, a threatening attitude alone affords no justification. The
adversary must have made some overt act indicative of imminent danger to the accused at
the time." Harper, 85 S.E.2d at 255 (citing Stoneman v. Commonwealth, 66 Va. (25 Gratt.)
887, 893 (1874); Berkeley v. Commonwealth, 14 S.E. 916, 916 (Va. 1892)) (emphasis added).
46. 234 S.E.2d 286 (Va. 1977).
47. Id. at 292.
48. See id. at 290-91.
49. See id. at 292.
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OTHER DEFENSES: IMPERFECT SELF-DEFENSE AND DIMINISHED
CAPACITY
"Imperfect" self-defense applies when the defendant, perceiving
a threat to her safety, acts unreasonably-for example, by using
more force than necessary to repel or stop the attack.50 Virginia,
however, does not recognize the imperfect self-defense claim.5' If
the defendant was at all at fault in provoking the attack, which is
a factual question, then the defendant loses her right to assert the
self-defense claim of justifiable homicide.52 If she fails to retreat
after first being at fault, she may not assert a self-defense claim of
excusable homicide.53 Thus, the Battered Woman Syndrome expert
testimony potentially provides a jury with a reason for the victim's
particular reaction.' The crucial difference the expert testimony
offers is to allow the jury to understand that she was in genuine
fear for her life and felt she needed to use this degree of force to
protect herself.55
Diminished capacity or diminished responsibility defenses
attempt to negate the requisite mens rea of the crime by presenting
evidence that the defendant lacked the mental capability to commit
the crime alleged.5" These defenses, however, are unavailable in
50. In Virginia, this is called the proportionality rule. See McGhee v. Commonwealth,
248 S.E.2d 808, 810 (Va. 1978) (holding that the defendant can use deadly force in self-
defense only when she fears "death or serious bodily harm to [her]self at the hands of [her]
victim"). For a general discussion of the proportionality rule, see PAUL H. ROBINSON,
CRIMINAL LAW DEFENSES § 131(d) (West 1984).
51. Ajury can only convict of a lesser-included offense. See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-266.1
(Michie 1995).
52. See Smith v. Commonwealth, 435 S.E.2d 414, 416 (Va. Ct. App. 1993) (citing
Perricilia v. Commonwealth, 326 S.E.2d 679, 685 (Va. 1985)).
53. See id. at 416 (citing Bailey v. Commonwealth, 104 S.E.2d 28, 31 (Va. 1958)).
54. See Patton, supra note 16, at *12-13.
55. See id. at *15.
56. [The diminished capacity] doctrine recognizes that although an accused was
not suffering from a mental disease or defect when the offense was committed
sufficient to exonerate him from all criminal responsibility, his mental capacity
may have been diminished by intoxication, trauma, or mental disease so that
he did not possess the specific mental state or intent essential to the particular
offense charged.
BLACK'S LAw DICTIoNARY 458 (6th ed. 1990).
[The diminished responsibility doctrine] refer[s] to lack of capacity to achieve
state of mind requisite for commission of crime. The concept of diminished
responsibility, also known as partial insanity, permits the trier of fact to regard
the impaired mental state of the defendant in mitigation of the punishment or
degree of the offense even though the impairment does not qualify as insanity
under the prevailing test.
Id. (citations omitted).
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Virginia.5" Other states, however, have found that when BWS
testimony is proffered, it is used to assert claims of either dimin-
ished capacity58 or insanity. 9
EXPERT TESTIMONY IN VIRGINIA
Virginia law allows admission of expert testimony to assist the
trier of fact in areas beyond the general knowledge of a layperson.6 °
In order to provide an expert opinion, one does not need an
academic or professional degree. 1 Anyone who possesses special-
ized knowledge, obtained through education, professional training,
or experience, may testify as an expert. 2 The trial judge has great
discretion in determining whether to allow an expert to testify
57. See Commonwealth v. Hackett, 32 Va. Cir. 338, 338 (1994) (citing Jenkins v.
Commonwealth, 423 S.E.2d 360, 367 (Va. 1992); Stamper v. Commonwealth, 324 S.E.2d 682,
688 (Va. 1985)).
58. See, e.g., United States v. Ramos-Oseguera, 120 F.3d 1028, 1040 (9th Cir. 1997)
(remanding case to allow district court to use downward departures in sentencing guidelines
with regard to diminished capacity defenses that included "youthful lack of guidance,"
imperfect duress, and Battered Woman Syndrome, based on abuse evidence offered to
mitigate drug-trafficking charges); State v. Mott, 931 P.2d 1046, 1048 (Ariz. 1997) (en banc)
(not allowing BWS testimony because it was offered to negate mens rea in a case of child
abuse), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1239 (1997); People v. Minnis, 455 N.E.2d 209, 217-18 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1983) (offering BWS testimony to explain why a woman mutilated the body of her abuser
after killing him). Offering BWS testimony also can prevent a criminal defendant from
asserting her Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination because the State can
compel mental examination by its own experts to rebut BWS testimony. See Hess v.
Macaskill, No. 94-35446, 1995 WL 564744, at **2 (9th Cir. Sept. 20, 1995) (finding BWS
technically not a defense of insanity or diminished capacity, yet still upholding State's right
to present its own expert testimony when a defendant seeks to introduce expert testimony
of insanity or diminished capacity).
59. Ohio, for example, requires that BWS testimony be offered in connection with a plea
of not guilty by reason of insanity. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2945.392 (West 1997). But
see Pugh v. State, 382 S.E.2d 143, 144 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989) (finding it unnecessary to decide
whether BWS testimony also raises an issue of insanity, mental illness, or incompetency as
it already was held to be independently admissible in a self-defense claim); State v. Moore,
568 So. 2d 612, 618 (La. Ct. App. 1990) (finding BWS testimony insufficient to establish an
insanity defense as defendant's actions before and after shooting her abuser did not indicate
that she suffered "from a mental disease or defect which rendered her incapable of
distinguishing right from wrong"); State v. Burton, 464 So. 2d 421, 427-28 (La. Ct. App. 1985)
(finding that there was no error in refusing BWS testimony in connection with her defense
of insanity because: 1) the jury was presented already with a basis for determining
defendant's sanity; 2) there was no evidence of an overt act at the time of the incident; 3) the
Louisiana Code restricted the admission of evidence of prior hostilities between the couple;
and 4) the jury needed to focus exclusively on "the incident in question" and not be made
aware of the victim's "undesirable nature").
60. See Callahan v. Commonwealth, 379 S.E.2d 476, 478 (Va. Ct. App. 1989).
61. See id. at 478.
62. See id. For a discussion of the difference between expert and non-expert testimony,
see Bradley v. Poole, 47 S.E.2d 341, 344 (Va. 1948).
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based on the expert's knowledge, the testimony's relevance to a fact
at issue, and its helpfulness to a trier of fact.63 Expert testimony
will be inadmissible if the jurors are as capable as the expert in
reaching an informed decision on the matter.' The jury is entitled
to determine how much weight to accord the testimony of an expert
witness, with the aid of jury instructions to that effect. 65
Evaluating the admissibility of expert testimony by mental
health professionals is more difficult, but the same basic rules
apply.66 The admissibility of an expert's testimony, when pertain-
ing to the question of the presence of a mental disease or defect,
depends largely on the "nature and extent of his knowledge."67 The
expert must not express opinions that involve the ultimate issue of
fact, which remains the sole province of the jury.68 In Virginia BWS
cases, this ultimate fact is whether the defendant was in imminent
harm at the time of the crime.69 BWS testimony, however, may not
help the fact finder determine these questions.7 °
BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME
Dr. Lenore Walker, the psychologist who coined the term
Battered Woman Syndrome in the late 1970's, defines that term
rather broadly.7' Generally, a battered woman is defined as a
woman who suffers repeated physical and mental abuse by her
partner, to the point that he can force her to do something against
her will.72
63. See Aster v. Gross, 371 S.E.2d 833, 837 (Va. Ct. App. 1988).
64. See David A. Parker Enters., Inc. v. Templeton, 467 S.E.2d 488, 490 (Va. 1996).
65. The standard Virginia jury instruction allows the jury to assess each expert's
education and experience, as well as the relevance, common sense, and saliency of their
expert opinions in the face of other facts of the case. See Lee v. Adrales, 778 F. Supp. 904,
906 (W.D. Va. 1991).
66. "[Plsychiatric experts... include all mental health professionals who by education
and training are competent 'to identify the elusive and often deceptive symptoms of insanity'
and who can translate those findings into meaningful information for courts and juries in
deciding legal insanity or other relevant issues involving mental states." Funk v.
Commonwealth, 379 S.E.2d 371, 373 (Va. Ct. App. 1989) (quoting in part Ake v. Oklahoma,
470 U.S. 68, 80 (1985)).
67. Landis v. Commonwealth, 241 S.E.2d 749, 750 (Va. 1978) (citing Rollins v.
Commonwealth, 151 S.E.2d 622, 626 (Va. 1966)).
68. See Ake, 470 U.S. at 81; Freeman v. Commonwealth, 288 S.E.2d 461, 462 (Va. 1982).
69. There also may be a question of determining who was "at fault" in the violent
incident. See supra notes 30-32, 52-53 and accompanying text
70. See infra notes 81, 87-91 and accompanying text for a discussion of how BWS
testimony may ask the jury to find ultimately contrary conclusions.
71. See WALKER, supra note 8, at xv.
72. See generally id. at 71-184 (discussing methods of coercion in abusive relationships).
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One of the first state supreme courts to look favorably on BWS
testimony and rule it admissible in a self-defense case was New
Jersey.73 The court looked at the work of Dr. Walker and summa-
rized her diagnosis of BWS as follows:74
According to Dr. Walker, relationships characterized by
physical abuse tend to develop battering cycles. Violent
behavior directed at the woman occurs in three distinct and
repetitive stages that vary both in duration and intensity
depending on the individuals involved.
Phase one of the battering cycle is referred to as the
"tension building stage," during which the battering male
engages in minor battering incidents and verbal abuse while the
woman, beset by fear and tension, attempts to be as placating
and passive as possible in order to stave off more serious
violence.
Phase two of the battering cycle is the "acute battering
incident." At some point during phase one, the tension between
the battered woman and the batterer becomes intolerable and
more serious violence inevitable. The triggering event that
initiates phase two is most often an internal or external event
in the life of the battering male, but provocation for more severe
violence is sometimes provided by the woman who can no longer
tolerate or control her phase-one anger and anxiety.
Phase three of the battering cycle is characterized by
extreme contrition and loving behavior on the part of the
battering male. During this period the man will often mix his
pleas for forgiveness and protestations of devotion with prom-
ises to seek professional help, to stop drinking, and to refrain
from further violence. For some couples, this period of relative
calm may last as long as several months, but in a battering
relationship the affection and contrition of the man will
eventually fade and phase one of the cycle will start anew.75
The New Jersey court determined that admitting Walker's
BWS research could help a jury by explaining the effect of BWS on
the woman's behavior throughout the relationship, such as why she
entered the relationship, stayed with the abuser, and failed to save
73. See State v. Kelly, 478 A.2d 364, 375-76 (N.J. 1984).
74. Courts looking to admit such testimony often cite this case and its citations to Dr.
Walker's text approvingly. Courts that cite this text provide two insights: 1) which citations
of Dr. Walker's work proved significant to their decision, and 2) which parts of Dr. Walker's
work influenced other courts and made this New Jersey court decision persuasive. But see
supra notes 14-15 and infra note 131 for examples of cases that rejected BWS testimony.
75. Kelly, 478 A.2d at 371 (citations omitted).
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herself sooner.7" The cyclical nature of the abuse coupled with
"[t]he loving behavior demonstrated by the batterer during phase
three reinforces whatever hopes these women might have for their
mate's reform and keeps them bound to the relationship."77
The court also placed some emphasis on society's failure to help
these women earlier in their lives, as Dr. Walker found that many
battered women grew up in violent households themselves and
therefore perceive violence as "normal."7"
Other women, however, become so demoralized and degraded by
the fact that they cannot predict or control the violence that
they sink into a state of psychological paralysis and become
unable to take any action at all to improve or alter the situa-
tion. There is a tendency in battered women to believe in the
omnipotence or strength of their battering husbands and thus
to feel that any attempt to resist them is hopeless.79
The New Jersey court also found Dr. Walker's explanation of
external factors that prevent battered women from leaving their
abusers-such as financial concerns, limited child care options, and
the general lack of support in our society for women, especially
those with children, seeking to escape violent relationships°-as
helpful to dispel a juror's assumptions about why women would
choose to stay in such relationships.8
In addition, battered women, when they want to leave the
relationship, are typically unwilling to reach out and confide in
their friends, family, or the police, either out of shame and
humiliation, fear of reprisal by their husband, or the feeling
that they will not be believed. 2
The New Jersey court also looked to the factors Dr. Walker and
other psychologists found to be important in determining whether
a woman suffers from BWS.83 Several personality traits are
76. See id. at 371-72.
77. Id.
78. See id. at 372..
79. Id.
80. See id. at 372.
81. See id.; see also WALKER, supra note 8, at 127-44 (discussing the inherent
inconsistency underlying why a woman would be helpless to leave her abuser and yet be able
to engage in the rational analysis of her financial situation to determine whether she should
stay despite the abuse).
82. Kelly, 478 A.2d at 372.
83. See id. at 372.
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common among battered women, including "low self-esteem,
traditional beliefs about the home, the family, and the female sex
role, tremendous feelings of guilt that their marriages are failing,
and the tendency to accept responsibility for the batterer's
actions." 4 These women fail to leave their husbands, not only
because they hold out hope of their partner getting better, but also
for fear of provoking an even more vicious attack. 5 Finally, the
New Jersey court urged that an understanding of the depth and
complexity of these factors, both societal and individual, was needed
in order to evaluate a battered woman's mental state.8 6
BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME TESTIMONY AND THE IMMINENT
HARM REQUIREMENT
Dr. Walker's work on Battered Woman Syndrome does not
provide the only example of conflicting conclusions.87 BWS portrays
battered women as suffering from a mental ailment short of
insanity,88 but some scholars debate whether research regarding
BWS nevertheless could support a defense of full-blown insanity. 9
In order to prove a defendant insane, the court must find that the
defendant was suffering from a mental disease or defect that
precluded the defendant from understanding right from wrong.9 °
This juxtaposition is extremely problematic in that proponents of
BWS expect a jury to believe (1) that a battered woman is both
helpless to understand or change her situation; (2) that she has an
acute sense of the events in the battering cycle to predict when she
is in imminent harm; and (3) that she was able to judge the
situation and act in her defense, while believing in the justification
of her actions.
91
84. Id.
85. See id.
86. See id.
87. See SCHOPP, supra note 43, at 103-04.
The perplexing nature of the discussion arises from the apparent tension in
describing those who suffer battered woman syndrome in a manner suggesting
that this syndrome distorts their perceptions and judgment regarding the
battering relationship yet simultaneously provides them with a special capacity
to predict events within that relationship with superior accuracy.
Id.
88. See id. at 116.
89. See id. at 116-25.
90. See State v. Moore, 568 So. 2d 612, 618 (La. Ct. App. 1990) (finding BWS insufficient
to establish proof of insanity).
91. See id.
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The problem of the "imminent harm" requirement92 has been
scrutinized in cases involving battered women. Courts that follow
the rationale of Harper v. Commonwealth,93 require an overt act:94
anything short of a lunging attack is not "immediate" enough to
sustain a claim of self-defense.95 For example, in Lumpkin v. Ray,96
a woman unsuccessfully challenged her murder conviction that
resulted from the trial court barring testimony concerning her "fear
of her husband and his violent behavior unless" she could show
"sufficient other evidence of self-defense."97 Without a precursory,
conventional self-defense claim, neither experts nor lay witnesses
could testify about the abuse she had suffered.9" On appeal, she
challenged the imminence requirement on equal protection
grounds.99 The Tenth Circuit held that the law neither discrimi-
nated against her because she was a woman nor because she was
a battered woman.100
BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME EXPERT TESTIMONY IN VIRGINIA
The court system in Virginia has refused to allow BWS expert
testimony regarding a defendant's mental state to be considered by
a jury in either the guilt phase or the sentencing phase of a trial.'
In contrast, the recent trend in other jurisdictions allows consider-
ation of this evidence. 10 2 Virginia allows evidence of abuse,'0 3 but
92. See supra notes 22, 41-47 and accompanying text.
93. 85 S.E.2d 249 (Va. 1955).
94. See supra notes 41-47 and accompanying text (discussing the overt act requirement).
95. See, e.g., Bechtel v. State, 840 P.2d 1, 11-12 (Okla. Crim. App. 1992) (discussing in
depth the traditional requirements of "imminent harm" in self-defense law and the
difficulties they pose for BWS cases).
96. 977 F.2d 508 (10th Cir. 1992).
97. Id. at 508.
98. See id.
99. See id. at 509.
100. See id. at 510.
101. See Commonwealth v. Hackett, 32 Va. Cir. 338, 338 (1994) (citing Jenkins v.
Commonwealth, 423 S.E.2d. 360 (Va. 1992); Stamper v. Commonwealth, 324 S.E.2d. 682 (Va.
1985)); see also supra note 14 for a discussion of how some jurisdictions treat pleas of other
than not guilty or not guilty by reason of insanity and supra notes 56-57 and accompanying
text for a discussion of the inadmissibility of diminished capacity defenses in Virginia.
102. These states include California, Georgia, Kansas, Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, New
Jersey, North Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, West Virginia,
and Wyoming. See Charles J. Aron, In Defense of Battered Women: A Source List of Cases;
States Respond to Expert Testimony, 20 HUM. RTs. 16, 16 (1993).
103. See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-270.6 (Michie 1995); see also VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-271.2
(Michie 1995) (compelling testimony of one spouse against the other in criminal cases
concerning acts committed against each other or in cases of sex crimes against each other or
their children); cf Wilson v. Commonwealth, 162 S.E. 15, 16 (Va. 1932) (stating that the
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not necessarily expert testimony of the effects of the abuse.' 4
Virginia will not allow any psychological testimony when there is
a danger that it will reach a conclusion on the ultimate issue of
fact;'0° that is, whether the battered woman was justified in her
claim of self-defense at the time of the crime in question.
CRITICISM OF BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME AND ITS USE IN THE
COURTROOM
The existence and underlying research of Battered Woman
Syndrome is not without its criticisms.' 6 Many scholars and courts
challenge both the research methods of those social scientists
engaged in the task of exploring BWS and its ultimate use in the
courtroom. 10 7 Expert testimony is especially confusing to a fact
finder when admitted in cases in which competing experts line up
to testify in even the most marginal of cases.'0°
Perhaps the most compelling critique of BWS testimony focuses
not on its use, but its conclusions.' 9 Dr. Walker wrote about the
cyclical nature of the violent relationship and how these women fail
to leave their abuser due to their "learned helplessness.""0 Yet this
testimony often is offered to show how the battered woman
rationally believed she was in danger of imminent harm and acted
justly."'
burden of obtaining consent for the waiver of spousal privilege rests on the Commonwealth).
104. See Hackett, 32 Va. Cir. at 338.
105. See Freeman v. Commonwealth, 288 S.E.2d 461, 468 (Va. 1982).
106. Among other problems, authors cite the inadequacy of the research, the lack of
scientific data, self-selection of subjects, and the charge that studies were conducted with
preconceived conclusions already in mind. See SCHOPP, supra note 43, at 96.
107. See id.
108. See David L. Faigman, Note, The Battered Woman Syndrome and Self-Defense: A
Legal and Empirical Dissent, 72 VA. L. REV. 619, 632-33 (1986).
109. See SCHOPP, supra note 43, at 114.
[E]xpert testimony regarding the battered woman syndrome carries potential
risk for the defendant. Testimony regarding the syndrome, and particularly
learned helplessness, portrays the defendant as one who suffers psychological
impairment undermining the accuracy of her perceptions and judgment
regarding the batterer and the relationship. As such it may actively undermine
her credibility with the jury by portraying her relevant beliefs as the product
of a pathological syndrome rather than as reasonable inferences from her
experience.
Id.
110. See WALKER, supra note 8, at 16.
111. See State v. Kelly, 478 A.2d 364, 377 (N.J. 1984).
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Even before a BWS-admissibility question is determined by a
court, a prima facie case of self-defense is necessary.112 In the self-
defense cases in which the defense hopes to admit BWS testimony,
it is because traditional self-defense or insanity pleas would be
unsuccessful and the proffered BWS testimony could "contextualize"
the circumstances surrounding the crime for the jury."3 Often,
there is a timing or reasonableness problem. 114 For example, when
a woman kills her abuser when he is asleep,"' the key prong of a
successful self-defense claim, that of "imminent harm," is no longer
available." 6 In order to get beyond this problem, the defendant
introduces BWS not only to allow the evidence of the previous abuse
to be heard,"7 but also to introduce the defendant's perception of
imminent harm and the ultimate reasonableness of her actions. 118
What results is a diminished capacity defense.
Unfortunately, this line of inquiry logically leads to a stereo-
type of a "typical" battered woman. BWS testimony can
mischaracterize battered women by forcing its adherents to
conclude that a battered woman can no longer face either her
112. See Bechtel v. State, 840 P.2d 1, 10-13 (Okla. Crim. App. 1992) (holding that a
defendant asserting BWS must still "show that she had a reasonable belief as to the
imminence of great bodily harm or death and as to the force necessary to compel it," but that
BWS testimony may illuminate the defendant's conceptualization of reasonableness and
imminence).
113. See Commonwealth v. Hackett, 32 Va. Cir. 338, 338-39 (1994); see also People v.
Minnis, 455 N.E.2d 209, 217-18 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983) (finding that the defendant could offer
BWS testimony to explain why she dismembered her husband's body after she killed him).
114. In Lentz v. State, for instance, a woman followed her batterer 100 feet to another
house after already shooting him twice, to shoot him again. See Lentz v. State, 604 So. 2d
243, 246-47 (Miss. 1992) (finding BWS testimony inadmissible in determining the woman's
reasonableness because the objective standard of reasonableness applies to all self-defense
cases in Mississippi, including BWS cases, and an expert's explanation of this behavior would
not have helped the jury because the behavior was just too unreasonable for BWS to provide
an adequate explanation).
115. This is the so-called "Burning Bed" scenario introduced to the public consciousness
in the TV movie of the same name. See Minnis, 455 N.E.2d at 211.
116. See supra notes 22, 41-47 (defining and discussing imminent danger).
117. This approach introduces expert testimony as to the reasonableness of self-defense
and the provocation element necessary to prove the justified homicide theory of self-defense
as defined under Virginia common law. See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-270.6 (Michie 1995).
118. This tactic introduces a broadened view of "imminent harm," the woman's reaction,
and the severity of force used against her abuser. See, for example, Minnis, 455 N.E.2d at
217-18, in which the defendant introduced BWS testimony to explain why she dismembered
her abuser after she killed him; State v. Anaya, 438 A.2d 892, 894 (Me. 1981), in which the
defendant offered BWS testimony to explain her continuous relationship with her abuser and
numerous suicide attempts as not inconsistent with her claim of self-defense; and State v.
Walker, 700 P.2d 1168, 1172 (Wash. Ct. App. 1985), in which the defendant asserted,
unsuccessfully, that stabbing her husband in the back was justified by her perception of
imminence as influenced by BWS.
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abuser or her situation rationally."9 Ostensibly the battered
woman's experiences have reduced her to a state of being that
renders her unable to determine rationally whether she is in
"imminent harm," as defined under the law.
2 °
In a very compelling argument, Donald Alexander Downs
reasons that the battered woman is not merely acting in a way that
is irrational, but is instead hyper-rational. 2' Presumably, she is
the only one who really knows the cycle of violence in the domestic
relationship. That experience gives her reasons and clues beyond
what either a jury or an expert could ascertain as to what consti-
tutes a justified realization of "imminent harm" at the hand of her
abuser.'22 Downs contends that it is these survival skills, and not
"learned helplessness," that keep the woman alive and give her the
ultimate strength to end the relationship, often through the only
way she knows-violence. 123
It is perhaps even more remarkable that it is this notion of
"learned helplessness" or the woman-as-ultimate-victim that
receives the most sympathy in our society, both intuitively and
through the popular media. 24 Even while other diminished-
capacity defenses or "abuse excuses" lose favor in the public eye,'
25
society is still able to see women collectively only as victims. 12 6
BWS experts continue to depict women as acting without wills of
their own,'27 and the continued debate over diminished capacity in
these cases furthers that paradigm. 128
Merely recognizing the legal problems with the use of BWS
expert testimony may not be enough to help those women who kill
or attempt to kill their abusers. When the testimony is allowed, it
119. See DOWNS, supra note 44, at 166-68.
120. See supra note 22.
121. See DOWNS, supra note 44, at 97-98. In fact, some court opinions seem to adopt both
views of the battered woman: that she is in a state of "learned helplessness" and is
incapable, through her despair, of leaving the relationship or of discovering her own survival
skills and that she has a heightened perception of the danger she is in and was acting
rationally by striking back at her abuser. See State v. Kelly, 478 A-2d 364, 377 (N.J. 1984).
122. See DOWNS, supra note 44, at 97.
123. See id. at 97-98.
124. See id. at 182-220 (theorizing that this phenomenon has more to do with broader
political concepts of citizenship and equality than misconstrued psychological research).
125. See DERSHOWITZ, supra note 23, at 45.
126. See DOWNS, supra note 44, at 141.
127. See id. at 147.
128. See generally id. at 138-81 (discussing the pitfalls of introducing BWS as a diminished
capacity defense).
1999] HOW PEEPLES CHANGED VIRGINIA SELF-DEFENSE LAW 315
often is used to explain such questions as "why didn't she leave?"129
rather than "what could we, as a society, have done to intervene?"30
ADMISSIBILITY OF BATrERED WOMAN SYNDROME TESTIMONY
Jurisdictions differ in deciding whether to admit BWS testi-
mony, 3' presumably both because of the above-labeled criticisms of
BWS and the lamentable continuation of myths surrounding
domestic violence in the courts.'3 2 BWS expert testimony, when
deemed admissible, also can open the door to evidence of the
domestic violence.133 This evidence may prove crucial to providing
juries with the totality of the circumstances, or context, of the
crime. 134 Courts may continue to rely on such testimony without
relying solely on lay witnesses or without relying too much on
questionable expert testimony that either confuses jurors or re-
victimizes the battered woman.
Is VIRGINIA LEANING TOWARD ADMISSION? COMMONWEALTH V.
HACKETT
In Commonwealth v. Hackett,135 a Virginia Circuit Court denied
a motion in limine to introduce BWS expert testimony, but allowed,
"within reason,"'36 testimony by lay witnesses of the defendant's
"circumstances predating her act."'37 The court reasoned that
admitting this testimony would allow the jury to "evaluate the
defendant's act in light of all facts and circumstances known to her
129. See, e.g., State v. Kelly, 478 A.2d 364, 377 (N.J 1984) (stating that BWS testimony
counters the myth "that battered wives are free to leave").
130. See WALKER, supra note 8, at 251-59.
131. For a court opinion rejecting BWS testimony, see, for example, State v. Mott, 931
P.2d 1046, 1048 (Ariz. 1997) (en banc), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1239 (1997). For an opinion
admitting BWS testimony, see, for example, United States v. Willis, 38 F.3d 170, 175-76 (5th
Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1145 (1995).
132. See supra notes 15, 47-49 and accompanying text.
133. See, e.g., State v. Baker, 424 A.2d 171, 173 (N.H. 1980) (finding BWS testimony to be
neither irrelevant nor unduly prejudicial in being offered to counter defendant's claim he
attempted to murder his wife in a moment of insanity). But see State v. Burton, 464 So. 2d
421, 427-28 (La. Ct. App. 1985) (finding inadmissible evidence of prior abuse because it would
cause prejudice to the victim and mislead the jury from focusing on "the event in question").
134. See, e.g., Kelly, 478 A.2d at 373-78 (discussing admission of expert testimony on BWS
and defendant's state of mind with respect to fear of imminent harm). But see Burton, 464
So. 2d at 427 (holding BWS testimony inadmissible when there was no evidence of an overt
act at the time of the incident).
135. 32 Va. Cir. 338 (1994).
136. Id. at 339.
137. Id.
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before the shooting. Thus, the defendant and others may testify
about the violence, if any, in the defendant's relationship with the
decedent."1
33
Obviously, only allowing testimony of lay witnesses and the
defendant herself presents its own problems. First, the defendant
has a constitutional right not to testify;139 furthermore, her decision
to take the stand and speak about the abuse may expose her case
to damaging character evidence.' 40 Second, the defendant may not
be physically or emotionally ready either to testify or to endure
harsh questioning under cross-examination by the prosecutor.
Third, if lay testimony is indeed the better option, it may be
severely limited in scope and probative value by the reality that
domestic violence typically occurs in the home where there are no
witnesses other than the couple involved. In such a scenario, the
only potential witnesses may be children who are emotionally and
physically damaged themselves by the violence they have wit-
nessed. 141 In a situation in which other people are aware of the
existence of violence in the home, they may not be intimately aware
of "all facts and circumstances"'42 relating to the abuse. Those
involved in this cycle of violence are often reluctant to share the
details of their circumstances to anyone, 143 much less to those who
would be in a position to testify in court. 4 4  Overall, the lay
testimony option may be favorable only in those courts that are not
willing to allow a parade of experts to testify. Lay testimony,
however, may not help either a criminal defendant supporting her
claim of self-defense or a jury evaluating that claim. 145 As indicated
above, lay testimony may not help a defendant's case if there were
no witnesses to the crime in question, evidence of battering was
138. Id.
139. See U.S. CONST. amend. V; see also Hess v. Macaskill, No. 94-35446, 1995 WL 564744,
at **2 (9th Cir. Sept. 20, 1995) (finding that an offer of BWS testimony effectively waived
defendant's Fifth Amendment right to refuse mental examination by State's experts).
140. See FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(1).
141. See WALKER, supra note 8, at 149-50.
142. Hackett, 32 Va. Cir. at 339.
143. See WALKER, supra note 8, at 74.
144. In fact, even in those circumstances in which a battered woman seeks help from
social services, the value of these reports as evidence in her criminal prosecution may be
limited. Cf VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-271.2 (Michie 1995) (excluding such records from the
Virginia Freedom of Information Act, unless they are disclosed by the custodian of such
records within her discretion and where such disclosure is not prohibited by law).
145. See Patton, supra note 16, at *13.
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explained away, or because, in a society such as ours, domestic
abuse is seen by the defendant's friends or family as "normal."46
THE CASE THAT COULD CHANGE VIRGINIA LAW: PEEPLES V.
COMMONWEALTH
InPeeples v. Commonwealth,147 the Court of Appeals of Virginia
departed from its previous stance against expert testimony on a
defendant's mental state when claiming self-defense. 4 The Peeples
court allowed the admission of expert testimony to show that a
murder defendant lacked the mental capacity to reasonably
understand the circumstances around him. 149 The court admitted
proffered expert testimony regarding the defendant's general
mental characteristics as merely probative evidence to the fact
finder on the ultimate issue.
150
The charges for which the trial court convicted Peeples, a
juvenile, were of "aggravated malicious wounding and use of a
firearm in the commission of aggravated malicious wounding."'5 '
The crimes stemmed from a drug transaction involving four
youths.'52 Peeples sold two other boys a "blunt"-a marijuana
cigar."' Immediately following the exchange, Peeples mistook the
actions of one of the boys as reaching for a gun, thinking the boy
was trying to rob him. 115 4 The testimony of the two boys, however,
tended to show that they, in fact, were not armed, nor were they
trying to rob Peeples, although they had been arguing with Peeples
over the drug transaction. 55 Peeples shot both boys multiple
times. 5 6 Peeples testified that he was afraid he was being robbed
and that he had reason to fear that he would be hurt, because one
of the boys he had shot had a reputation for violence in the
neighborhood.'57
146. See generally WALKER, supra note 8, at 11-17 (discussing societal indifference to
domestic violence).
147. 504 S.E.2d 870 (Va. Ct. App. 1998).
148. See id. at 872.
149. See id. at 873-75 (holding that the expert testimony was admissible to aid in his claim
of self-defense).
150. See id. at 875 n.4.
151. Id. at 872.
152. See id.
153. See id.
154. See id.
155. See id.
156. See id.
157. See id.
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The admissibility of psychological expert testimony offered
regarding Peeples's diminished capacity, composed of various social
problems and an IQ of fifty-five, was at issue on appeal. 158 The
defense contended that Peeples's subjective evaluation of the
situation was crucial to his claim of self-defense. 159 The Virginia
Court of Appeals agreed and held that expert testimony concerning
Peeples's general mental condition was admissible because his state
of mind was at issue in evaluating the truthfulness of his claim of
self-defense. 16 The court distinguished the present case from what
previously had been controlling on this issue, Stamper v. Common-
wealth,'6' which held that "evidence of a criminal defendant's
mental state at the time of the offense is, in the absence of an
insanity defense, irrelevant to the issue of guilt."'62
EXPERT TESTIMONY ON BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME AND JURY
DELIBERATION
The Peeples decision suggests that Virginia courts may now be
open to reevaluating the admissibility of BWS expert testimony
when the mental state of the defendant is at issue, even in the
absence of an insanity defense. Although it is difficult to general-
ize, as all cases turn on specific facts, BWS often is offered to
dispute the common assumptions that jury members bring to the
deliberation room.16 Dr. Walker's expertise two decades ago was
offered mainly to dispel the myths surrounding domestic violence
and to answer the question of why a battered woman would choose
to remain with her abuser. 164 Battered Woman Syndrome testi-
mony also is offered to compel the jury to find that the ultimate use
of deadly force was justified, 165 as required in the law of self-defense
in Virginia. 166
158. See id. at 873.
159. See id. at 873-74.
160. See id. at 876.
161. 324 S.E.2d 682 (Va. 1985).
162. Id. at 688.
163. See State v. Kelly, 478 A.2d 364, 377-78 (N.J. 1984).
164. See id. at 370.
165. See id. at 373-74.
166. See McGhee v. Commonwealth, 248 S.E.2d 808, 810 (Va. 1978).
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Is THERE ANOTHER WAY? How VIRGINIA MAY SUCCESSFULLY
AVOID THE BATrERED WOMAN SYNDROME TESTIMONY QUAGMIRE
Courts in many jurisdictions have accepted BWS testimony
when offered to show a defendant's general state of mind. I"7 Many
scholars, however, argue that BWS testimony is a completely
inadequate, and even detrimental, remedy to the plight of battered
women defendants. 16
8
The problem is that traditional reliance on BWS testimony asks
juries to accept that the defendant was not rational in staying in
the relationship due to her "learned helplessness," but that her one
affirmative act, killing the abuser, was rational and justified. 169
What the previous unmodified BWS testimony tried to make up
for was the sins of the society at large in perpetuating the problem
of domestic violence. 7 ° BWS, in effect, gives an excuse for jury
nullification.'
Donald Alexander Downs has proposed that the proper solution
is a modified Battered Woman Syndrome testimony.' s What is
needed is expert testimony that does not imply that the defendant
should be exonerated from culpability because of diminished
capacity.7 3 Instead, this testimony should attempt to explain the
psychological complexities of her situation and answer the question
of her "choosing" to remain with her abuser-in a way that does not
167. See, e.g., People v. Minnis, 455 N.E.2d 209, 218 (Ill. Ct. App. 1983) (stating that "[tihe
defendant had a right to present evidence relevant to her explanation of her conduct, no
matter how far-fetched it might appear to the average individual"); Kelly, 478 A.2d at 375-77
(finding BWS testimony relevant in showing that the defendant "honestly believed she was
in imminent danger of death," as well as the reasonableness of that belief).
168. See DOWNS, supra note 44, at 6-11; Downs & Gerstmann, supra note 44, at 242.
169. See DOWNS, supra note 44, at 5-11.
Battered women are victims, but they normally do not surrender reason in their
desperation, at least when it comes to the single most important issue in self-
defense cases: the reasonable perception of imminent danger .... The
syndrome connection portrays the victims of abuse as incapable of exercising
reason and responsibility. Can we not achieve justice in this domain without
asking these victims to shed the very attributes that make equal citizenship
possible?
Id. at 6-7.
170. See, e.g., Downs & Gerstmann, supra note 44, at 224 ("Sometimes it appears that
BWS was propounded in part to 'cover' the legal system's original sin of letting batterers
have their way with their victims.").
171. See id. at 225.
172. See, e.g., id. at 227 ("The focus should be on battered women's situation, not battered
women's syndrome.").
173. See DOWNS, supra note 44, at 9-10.
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further victimize the defendant by portraying her as incapable of
making a rational choice. 174
A case-specific jury instruction could read as follows:
[Ihf the defendant's fears [of an overt threatening act by the
victim against the defendant or another person] were reason-
able under the circumstances of the case (which include the
nature of the relationship as well as the activities of the
[proximate] time in question), then she has a right to defend
herself [with force necessary to repel the attack] even if [you]
believe[ she factually misjudged the situation. Evidence of her
previous beatings do not justify her actions at the time at issue,
but it [may] show [ why her perceptions of danger might have
been reasonable [for a woman in that abusive relationship to
believe that lethal force was necessary to prevent serious bodily
harm to herself] under the circumstances.175
An expansion of the traditional jury instruction on self-defense
seems to be the only way to properly resolve this question.
176
CONCLUSION
The Virginia courts are now at a crossroads in the debate over
whether to admit BWS expert testimony. If the purpose of the
testimony is to provide an explanation for a battered woman
defendant's "unusual" behavior, admitting it without modifying self-
defense law will lead a jury to simultaneous and inconsistent
conclusions as to the mental health and ultimate culpability of the
defendant. 177 Clearly, this testimony begs more questions than it
174. See id. at 8.
175. Downs & Gerstmann, supra note 44, at 250 (alterations added). "Accordingly,
instructions about imminence and contextualized reason should include references to the
exculpatory nature of reasonable mistakes of fact." Id.
176. See generally Deborah Ann Klis, Reforms to Criminal Defense Instructions: New
Patterned Jury Instructions Which Account for the Experience of the Battered Woman Who
Kills Her Battering Mate, 24 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 131 (1994) (discussing the significance
of revising jury instructions to include a broader consideration of the defendant's subjective
perception of imminent danger).
177. See DOWNS, supra note 44, at 6-7.
Trauma can compromise mental competence or functionality when it comes to
such things as assessing the destiny of the relationship or the feasibility of
extricating oneself from the clutches of violence. But trauma often has the
opposite effect on other perceptions, including discerning the inclinations,
needs, and potential violence of the batterer to whom the woman is
"traumatically bonded'. ... The'more we understand the intersubjectivity of
such bonding, the more we come to appreciate the counterintuitive link between
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answers and should not be admitted alone. If, however, the purpose
of self-defense law is to prevent those women who justifiably kill
their batterers from being sentenced to prison for murder, then
further modifications of the law of self-defense, by way of adjusted
jury instructions, will be needed. Perhaps necessary too, then, is
an admission by our court systems that until our society is able to
prevent violent relationships from continuing, we should not let
these abused women suffer further consequences for their crimes.
Rather than letting BWS testimony in through the back door, in the
form of a "contextualized" self-defense claim, the criminal justice
system should recognize the reasonable belief these women had
when they acted-the belief that they were fighting for their lives.
MARYBETH H. LENKEVICH
trauma and heightened rationality concerning the need for self-defensive
maneuvers.
Id. at 7.
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